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ABOLITION OF WAGE GARNlISHMENT
JOSEPH C. SWEENEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
in legendary times it is said that Roman law permitted creditors to arrest
a defaulting debtor, chain him, and offer him for sale as a slave. If no
buyer were found, the creditors could cut up the debtor, each creditor
receiving his proportionate share.' Although Anglo-American law never
permitted slavery or butchery for debt, it did provide reasonably close
equivalents: Debtors' Prison2 and Wage Garnishment.3
Now, as part of the 1968 Consumer Protection Legislation,' Congress
will regulate wage garnishment for the first time. It is contended here
that Congress, in the exercise of its Bankruptcy' and Commerce' Powers,
should abolish wage garnishment.7
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. H. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law 190-92 (2d ed. 1952).
During the mature years of Roman law a liquidation-type bankruptcy without provision for
discharge of the debtor grew up under the law of Bonorum Emptio (or Vendito). At the
liquidation sale the highest bidder purchased all the debtor's goods in one lot, and was
permitted to proceed against any after-acquired property of the debtor. It was also possible
to achieve a composition, a type of settlement, with the creditors, scaling down their claims
in exchange for immediate payment. W. Buckland & A. McNair, Roman Law. and Common
Law 144, 150, 256 (2d ed. rev. by F. Lawson 1952); W. Buckland, A Manual of Roman
Private Law, 245-46 (1928); H. Jolowicz, supra at 225.
2. See T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 346 (3d ed. 1940). In 1839
federal law abolished debtor's prison in those states which had abolished them. Act of Feb. 28,
1839, ch. 35, 5 Stat. 321. During the years of "Jacksonian Democracy," debtors' prisons were
abolished in most of the Eastern states which still had them. See C. Warren, Bankruptcy in
United States History 52 (1935); Note, Present Status of Execution against The Body of The
judgment Debtor, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 306 (1957). New York's debtors' prison was abolished
in 1831. Law of April 26, 1831, ch. 300, (1831] N.Y. Laws 396; see Note, Arrest and
Imprisonment in Civil Actions in New York, 26 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 172 (1951). In 1969 the
only state to retain a debtor's prison for civil debts (other than alimony or child support)
is Maine. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1968, at 75, cols. 3-4.
3. Wage garnishment at common law was a notification to employers not to pay the
employee but rather to pay the plaintiff-creditor. The creditor was thereby enabled to reach
the property (wages or salary) of the debtor while in the hands of the employer. Restate-
ment of Judgements §§ 35, 36 (1942).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (Supp. IV, 1969) (popularly known as the Truth-in-Lending
Act).
5. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power . . . to establish
Uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies .... " Congressional findings in support of
the legislation were: "The great disparities among the laws of the several States relating
to garnishment have, in effect, destroyed the uniformity of the bankruptcy laws and
frustrated the purposes thereof in many areas of the country." 15 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(3)
(Supp. IV, 1969).
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This study deals only with wage garnishment and is not concerned
with the garnishment or attachment of other assets nor does it consider
the related problems of wage assignments as security, or levies on wages
by the Internal Revenue Service or other public authority.
The federal garnishment restrictions, which will become effective
July 1, 1970, are a compromise between House bills which would have
abolished or severely curtailed garnishment and milder reform legislation
favored by the Senate.' The key provision is that:
[T]he maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any
work week which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed (1) 25 per centum of his
disposable earnings for that week, or (2) the amount by which his disposable earn-
ings for that week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage ... which-
ever is less.9
The garnishment restriction law is not to be applied to support orders,
State or Federal Tax debts, or Chapter XIII Wage-earner Plans,10 and
State laws prohibiting garnishment entirely or restricting its exercise
more closely than the federal law are not to be affected.' Another im-
portant provision forbids the employer to fire an employee against whom
a single garnishment order has been entered. 2 These federal restrictions
6. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. Further Congressional findings in support of the legislation
were "(1) The unrestricted garnishment of compensation due for personal services en-
courages the making of predatory extensions of credit. Such extensions of credit divert
money into excessive credit payments and thereby hinder the production and flow of goods
in interstate commerce. (2) The application of garnishment as a creditors' remedy fre-
quently results in loss of employment by the debtor, and the resulting disruption of em-
ployment, production, and consumption constitutes a substantial burden on Interstate
commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1) (2) (Supp. IV, 1969).
7. Wage garnishment is defined as, "any legal or equitable procedure through which
the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment of any debt." 15
U.S.C. § 1672 (1968).
8. S. 5, 90th Cong., 2d Seass. (1968); H.R. 11601, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); 2 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 1962 (1968). The House bill proposed a complete prohibition of
wage garnishment. Id. at 1978. The bill was subsequently amended by a proposal of Congress-
man Halpern to substitute the provisions of New York's Income Execution Law, N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 5231 (1963). See H.R. Rep. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). See also
Comment, Consumer Legislation and The Poor, 76 Yale L.J. 745 (1967).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (Supp. IV, 1969). "Earnings" is defined as "compensation paid
or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus,
or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program."
"Disposable earnings" is defined as "that part of the earnings of any individual remaining
after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required by law to be withheld." Id.
§ 1672.
10. Id. § 1673.
11. Id. § 1677.
12. Id.
WAGE GARNISHMENT
have been repeated, pro tanto, in Uniform Consumer Credit Code,' 3 a
comprehensive codification of the entire field of consumer credit rela-
tions, 14 prepared by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as an
outgrowth of the Federal Consumer Protection Act.
The new Code includes provisions on: revolving charge accounts, dis-
closure of real interest rates, extra credit charges including life insurance,
regulation of rate advertising, usury and maximum interest provisions,
home solicitation, confession of judgment, deficiency judgments, and
wage garnishment. The Code adopts the federal concept of disposable
earnings, but increases the exemption from thirty to forty times the
federal minimum hourly wage.' 5 More importantly the Code absolutely
prohibits discharge of an employee by reason of garnishment.10 Prior to
the enactment of the prohibition on firing employees for a single garnish-
ment in the new federal law only four states had attempted this
13. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code was approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on July 30, 1968, following enactment of the Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act of May. The Code was approved by the American Bar
Association on August 7, 1968 and submitted to the states. As of September, 1969 it had
been enacted by two states: Oklahoma and Utah.
14. See Felsenfeld, Uniform, Uniformed and Unitary Laws Regulating Consumer Credit,
37 Fordham L. Rev. 209 (1968); James & Fragomen, The Uniform Consumer Credit
Code: Inadequate Remedies under Article V and VI, 57 Geo. L.J. 923 (1969); Kripke,
Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 445
(1968); Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1
(1969); Spanogle, The U3C.-It may Look Pretty But Is It Enforceable?, 29 Ohio St.
L.J. 624 (1968); Warren & Jordan, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 Colum. L.
Rev. 387 (1968).
15. "The maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any
workweek which is subjected to garnishment to enforce payment of a judgment arising
from a consumer credit sale, consumer lease, or consumer loan may not exceed the lesser
of (a) 25 per cent of his disposable earnings for that week, or (b) the amount by which
his disposable earnings for that week exceed forty times the Federal minimum hourly wage
prescribed by Section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, U.S.C. tit. 29,
§ 206(a) (1), in effect at the time the earnings are payable." Uniform Consumer Credit
Code [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.C.] § 5.105(2). The federal minimum as of Sept. 1969 is
$1.60 per hour. See U.C.C.C. § 5.105, Comment. It has been suggested that the Special
Committee of Commissioners on Uniform Laws, a state oriented group, drafted these pro-
visions as a reaction to the provision of the federal law giving the Secretary of Labor
power to exempt from the law garnishments under "substantially similar" state laws (15
U.S.C. § 1676 (Supp. IV, 1969)) so as to maximize state sovereignty over this aspect of con-
sumer finance. Felsenfeld, supra note 14, at 211-12.
16. U.C.C.C. § 5.106: "No employer shall discharge an employee for the reason that a
creditor of the employee has subjected or attempted to subject unpaid earnings of the
employee to garnishment or like proceedings directed to the employer for the purpose of
paying a judgment arising from a consumer credit sale, consumer lease, or consumer loan."
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reform. 7 Anticipating the Supreme Court by a year the Code prohibits
garnishment prior to the entry of judgment. 8
II. HISTORY OF WAGE GARNISHMENT
Despite the summary and harsh nature of this collection remedy it
is not a survival of medieval common law but rather a nineteenth century
proceeding in aid of execution of judgments by attachment.
Actions were commenced at common law by attachment, a direction
to the Sheriff, Capias Ad Respondendum,0 to seize the body or property
of the defendant to answer plaintiff's writ. However, such pre-trial
security in goods or lands did not become customary"0 and, although the
latter remains a possibility today in states still using common law writs,
it has no place in the ordinary law suit in most of the states, so that
plaintiffs must bear the risk of defendants' bankruptcy, death or other
default during the course of trial and post-trial procedures. This modern
result comes from a conscious policy against unnecessary clouding of
commerical titles. However, all states do make provision for pre-trial
attachment in two special situations: where there is danger of defendant
absconding with the fruits of his fraud, plaintiff may petition for pre-trial
attachment; 2' and where defendant cannot be found within the jurisdic-
tion, actions may be commenced by seizure of lands, goods or other
assets, sometimes described as Process Quasi In Rem or Foreign Attach-
ment.22 The latter has led to an expansion of the type and character of
property which could be the subject of execution.
The collection (or execution) of money judgments employed different
17. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-361(h) (Supp. 1969): discharge, disdpline or suspension
of employee prohibited unless more than seven garnishments in one year; N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5252 (Supp. 1969): discharge or layoff prohibited; Vt. Stat. Ann. it. 12, § 3165 (Suppi. 1969):
discharge prohibited unless previously garnished on five or more separate occasions arising
from separate actions. Neither the absolute prohibition on discharge nor the restrictions on
such discharge will prevent litigation as to the exact cause of the discharge. Perhaps the
absolute prohibition of garnishment as in Pennsylvania and Texas, see notes 32-33 infra, will
be the best way of preventing unnecessary loss of employment. See James & Fragomen, supra
note 14, at 937. The outright prohibition of discharge for garnishment as in Hawaii and
New York is preferable since it will deter creditors from splitting up causes of action to gain
leverage on the debtor.
18. U.C.C.C. § 5.104. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
19. B. Shipman, Hand-Book of Common Law Pleading 18-19 (1894). See Fox, Process
of Imprisonment at Common Law, 39 L.Q. Rev. 46 (1923).
20. Mussman & Riesenfeld, Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1942).
See Sturges & Cooper, Credit Administration and Wage Earner Bankruptcies, 42 Yale L.J.
487, 503-07 (1933).
21. Mussman & Riesenfeld, supra note 20, at 11.
22. Id. at 8.
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types of attachment at common law. One such procedure, Levari Facias,
permitted chattels and lands of debtors to be constrained (held for
ransom) to compel satisfaction of a debt.23 Another, Fieri Facias, was an
ancient procedure whereby goods of the debtor could be seized and sold
by the sheriff to satisfy the judgment debt.-4 In 1285 the Statute of
Westminster II authorized yet another procedure, Elegit, whereby goods
and the use of a portion of the debtor's lands, a tenancy by Elegit, could
be seized and sold.25 The law courts, however, could not give the judg-
ment creditor complete relief against the fraudulent debtor or the debtor
whose only asset was land, thus creditors sought and received the aid of
equity through the Statute on Fraudulent Conveyances in 1571, and the
subsequent development of Chancery practice to decree the actual sale of
debtors' lands.26 Exemptions from execution also came very early, in fact
in the same 1285 statute as the new execution procedure.27
In the United States, during the early years of the nineteenth century,
there was a consolidation of creditor's remedies into the all-purpose Writ
of Execution. 8 Concurrently, there was a vast judicial as well as legis-
lative expansion of the type and character of debtors' properties which
could be reached by the new writ, going beyond vested estates in realty
and corporeal assets in personalty to reach future interests, choses in
action and intangible assets.2 Wage garnishment followed as a logical
extension of this trend. Since wage garnishment developed after the
abolition of debtors' prisons,3" it did not seem unreasonable and was in
the spirit of the nineteenth century principles of freedom of contract and
survival of the fittest. It appears, however, that the policy factors in-
volved in allowing creditors to force a wage cut on blue-collar employees
23. Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law-A Historical Inventory
and a Prospectus, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 155, 158 (1957). See also Loyd, Executions at Common
Law, 62 U. Pa. L. Rev. 354 (1914).
24. Riesenfeld, supra note 23, at 157. Another procedure which could be used where the
action had been commenced by Capias ad Respondendum was execution by Capias ad
Satisfadendum whereby the sheriff seizes the body of the defendant to satisfy the judgment.
See A. Scott and R. Kent, Cases and Other Materials on Civil Procedure 990-93 (1967).
25. Riesenfeld, supra note 23, at 157. See also 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History
of English Law 596 (2d ed. 1898).
26. Riesenfeld, supra note 23, at 161.
27. Id. at 157 n.7.
28. Id. at 163-64. See R. Shinn, Treatise on the American Law of Attachment and
Garnishment (1896); Note, Wage Garnishment in Kentucky, 57 Ky. L.J. 92 (1968).
29. G. Glenn, The Law of Fraudulent Conveyances 40-46 (1931). See Hulbert v. Hulbert,
216 N.Y. 430, 111 N.E. 70 (1916).
30. See Boyd v. Buckingham & Co., 29 Tenn. 433, 435 (1850): "[W]hen it is remembered
that the right to imprison the debtor had been abolished by the act of 1842 . . . only one
year before the passage of the attachment law under consideration, the object of the legis-
lature in changing the attachment law, will plainly appear."
19691
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38
were never seriously considered in the formative years of the remedy, a
period when the primitive industrial economy did not require massive
consumer credit. Subsequently, state legislatures, acting alternatively
under the pressures of both organized labor and the business community,
attempted to regulate the remedy by exemptions, inclusions, and exclu-
sions producing a quagmire of difficult and confusing rules.
Although the Supreme Court has said that wage garnishment laws
"would pass muster under a feudal regime," 3' they did not. Present day
wage garnishment and the exemptions therefrom are a product of the
modem industrial age and, as such, are entirely statutory.82
31. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
32. Ala. Code tit. 7, §§ 995-1071 (1958) ; Alaska Stat. § 09.35.080 (Supp. 1969) ; Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 12-1594 (1956) ; Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-207 (Supp. 1967), 31-142 (1962) ; Cal.
Civ. Pro. Code §§ 542(b), 690.10 (West 1955), 544 (West Supp. 1968) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 77-2-4 (1963); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-361 (1958, amended in part in Supp. 1969);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4913 (1953, amended in part in Supp. 1968); D.C. Code Ann.
§§ 16-572, 16-573 (1966); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 222.11 (1961) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 46-208 (1965);
Hawaii Rev. Stat. ch. 652 (1968); Idaho Code Ann. § 11-205 (1948); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 62,
§ 73 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-4406 (1968); Iowa Code Ann. § 627.10
(Supp. 1969) ; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2310 (Supp. 1968) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 427.010(2) (1969);
La. Rev. Stat. §§ 13:3881, 13:3921-27 (1968); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 2602 (1964
amended in part Supp. 1968) (trustee process); Md. Ann. Code art. 9, §§ 31, 31A, 31B
(1957); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 246, § 28 (Supp. 1968); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 600.7511 (1968); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 550.37 (Supp. 1969); Miss. Code Ann. § 307 (Supp.
1968); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 513.440 (Supp. 1968), 525.030 (1953); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
§ 93-5816 (Replacement 1964) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1558 (1964) ; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090
(1967); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 512:21 (1968) (Trustee Process); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:17-61
(1952); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 26-2-1 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231 (1963); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 1-362 (1953) ; N.D. Cent. Code § 32-09-02 (Supp. 1969) ; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2329.62,
2329.66 (Page Supp. 1968) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 31, § 4 (1955) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 23.180 (1965) ;
Pa. Stat. tit. 42, § 886 (1966); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 9-26-4 (Supp. 1967); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 10-1731 (1962); S.D. Code §§ 33.2404, 37.5001 (Supp. 1960); Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-207
(Supp. 1968); Tex. Const. art. 16 § 28 (1876); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 3832, 3835,
4099 (1966); Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-1 (Supp. 1969); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 3020(5)
(Supp. 1969) (trustee process); Va. Code Ann. § 34-29 (Supp. 1968); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 7.32.280 (Supp. 1968); W. Va. Code Ann. § 38-4-12 (1966); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 267.18-
267.24 (Supp. 1969); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-422 (1957). See Brunn, Wage Garnishment in
California: A Study and Recommendations, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 1214 (1965); LaGrone, Re-
covery of a Florida Judgment by Garnishing Wages of the Head of a Family, 17 U. Fla.
Rev. 196 (1964); Comment, Garnishment of Wages in Pennsylvania: Its History and
Rationale, 70 Dick. L. Rev. 199 (1966); Legislation, Garnishment in Florida: Analysis,
Assessment, and Proposals, 19 U. Fla. L. Rev. 99 (1966); Note, Wage Garnishment as a
Collection Device 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 759. See generally Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215
(1905). See also Annots., 93 A.L.R.2d 995 (1964); 86 A.L.R.2d 1013 (1962); 82 A.L.R.2d
858 (1962); 75 A.L.R.2d 1437 (1961); 56 A.L.R.2d 13 (1957); 22 A.L.R.2d 904 (1952);
7 A.L.R.2d 680 (1949).
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III. PATTERNS OF STATUTORY GANISqHMENT
No two states' wage garnishment laws are alike and it is difficult to
characterize the laws under broad headings. Thirteen states apparently
exempt 100% of a wage earner's salary under certain circumstances. Of
these, only Pennsylvania and Texas33 have demonstrated a strong
public policy against all manner of wage garnishment. The remainder
generally condition the exemption upon the wage earner's status as head
of a household; 3 4 the use to which the salary may be put, usually in-state
family support;35 the character of the wages to be garnished; " or the
character of plaintiff as collection agency." It is of interest to note here
a Minnesota statutory provision which exempts from garnishment the
first six months' wages earned by a person going off relief.3 ,
Most states exempt percentages of wages from garnishment, thereby
eliminating the necessity for frequent statutory revision because of infla-
tion. Thus, eight states exempt 90% or more of the garnishee's wage"
while two states exempt 80% or more." In an inflationary economy it
is estimated that the average wage earner needs from 85 to 90% of his
salary just to meet current expenses.4 It would appear, therefore, that
legislation permitting a creditor to garnish more than ten percent of the
debtor's wage, such as the new Federal Consumer Protection Act, might
properly be characterized as antisocial. Ten states exempt more than
33. Texas Const. art. 16, § 28; Pa. Stat. it. 42, § 886 (1966).
34. Fla. Stat. § 222.11 (1961).
35. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 690.11 (West Supp. 1968); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 550.37(13)
(Supp. 1969), 575.05 (1947); Mont Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-5816 (1947); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 21.090(h) (1967); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-362 (1953); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 850 (Supp.
1969); S.C. Code Ann. § 10-1731 (1962); S.D. Code § 33.2404 (Supp. 1960).
36. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 30-207 (Supp. 1967).
37. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2310(d) (Supp. 1968).
38. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 550.37 (Supp. 1969).
39. DeL Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4913(b) (Supp. 1968) (New Castle County only); Ind.
Ann. Stat. § 2-3501 (1968) (907o% of excess over $15 per week) ; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2310
(Supp. 1968); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 525.030 (1959) (for heads of families); Neb. Rev. Stat. §
25-1558 (1964) (for heads of families); NJ. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:17-56 (1952), 2A:17-57 (Supp.
1969) (90% exempt if wages exceed $48 per week up to annual income of $2500); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5231(b) (1963) (90% exempt if wage exceeds $30 per week, otherwise exempt);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2715.30 (1954).
40. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 62, § 73 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); La. Rev. Stat. § 13:3881(l)
(1968) (80% of excess over $100 per month minimum).
41. Bureau of Labor Statistics. See Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study
and Recommendations, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 1214, 1245 (1965).
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50% of the wage but not more than 75%42 and eleven exempt 50% or
less.4" In these latter states the problem is, obviously, acute.
There are many states whose legislation exempts a fixed amount of
the wage rather than a fixed percentage; six such states have legisla-
tion which combine the fixed percent with a minimum definite amount.4"
No state exempts as much as $100 per week, but ten states exempt less
than $100 per week.45
It is estimated that at present the poverty level, the minimum amount
necessary to support a family of four in the United States in an urban
surrounding, is $3,335 ($64.13 per week).40  Furthermore, the Nixon
42. Ala. Code tit. 7, § 630 (1960) (75%); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 77-2-4 (1963); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4913(a) (1953) (60% in Kent and Sussex counties) ; Idaho Code Ann.
§ 11-205(7) (1948); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 427.010(2)(3) (1969); Md. Ann. Code art. 9, §§ 31,
31A, 31B (1957), art. 83, § 8 (Supp. 1969); Miss. Code Ann. § 307(Tenth) (Supp. 1968);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 31, §§ 1 (Supp. 1969), 4(Fifth) (1955); Va. Code Ann. § 34-29 (Supp.
1968).
43. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-1594, 33-1126 (1956) ; Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 690.11 (West
1955); Idaho Code Ann. § 11-205(7) (1948); Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 27A.7511(2) (3), 27AA031
(1962); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 550.37(13) (Supp. 1969), 575.05 (1947); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
§ 93-5816 (1964); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090(h) (1967); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 23.180 (1965);
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-1(7) (1953); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 272.18(15) (Supp. 1969); Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 1-422 (1957).
44. Ga. Code Ann. § 46-208 (1965) ($3 per day plus 50% of remainder); Hawaii Rev.
Stat. ch. 652-1 (1968) (95% of first $100 per month, 90% of next $100; 80% of remainder) ;
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-3501 (1968) ($15 per week plus 90% of remainder); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§§ 2A:17-56 (1952), 17-50 (Supp. 1969) (90% above minimum $18 per week); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. §§ 2329.62(C), 2329.66 (F), 2329.69 (Page Supp. 1968) (80% of first $300 per month
and 60% of remainder for heads of families to minimum $150, $100 for others); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 12, § 3020(5) (Supp. 1969) (50% or $60, whichever is less). See also D.C. Code
Ann. § 16-572 (1966) (90% of first $200 per month, 80% of next $300 and 50% of the
remainder).
45. Alaska Stat. § 09.35.080 (Supp. 1969) ($350 earned within 30 days for married
workers but only $200 for single); Iowa Code Ann. § 627.10 (Supp. 1969) ($35 per week
for head of family plus $3 for each dependent); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 2602(6)
(Supp. 1968) (not exceeding $40) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 246, § 28 (Supp. 1968) ($50 per
week); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 512:21 (II) (1968) ($40 per week); N.D. Cent. Code
§ 32-09-02 (Supp. 1969) ($35 per week if not head of a family, $50 if head of a family plus
$5 for each dependent up to $25 per week); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 23.180 (1965) ($175 except
for necessaries) ; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 9-26-4 (12c) (Supp. 1967) ($50) ; Tenn. Coda Ann.
§§ 26-207, 26-208 (Supp. 1968) ($20 per week for head of family plus $2.50 for each de-
pendent); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7.32.280 (Supp. 1968) ($35 per week plus $5 for each
dependent to maximum of $50 per week for heads of families, $25 per week for single
persons).
46. The Index of poverty developed by the Social Security Administration is described
in Orshansky, Counting The Poor: Another Look at the Poverty Profile, Soc. Sec. Bull., Jan.
1965. The Dept. of Labor describes an annual wage of $5,915 ($113.75 per week) to be a poor
standard of living for an urban family. Time, Aug. 8, 1969, at 42.
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Welfare Plan, which, if passed, will take effect in 1971, declares the
poverty level for an urban family of four persons to be $3,920 per year
($75.38 per week).4 7 If this is so, and there is no indication to the con-
trary, a statute which does not exempt $100 from garnishment may well
force a family below the poverty level. Couple this factor with an absence
of an annual legislative revision to counter the effects of inflation and
this legislation should be characterized as antisocial.
Another major statutory requirement in some states is that the wages
to be garnished must be presently due. A separate garnishment order
must, therefore, be served for each pay period." Other states permit
prospective garnishment, fixing the lien on future wages until satis-
fied. 9 Again, entitlement to exemption may be dependent on one's status
as head of a family 0 or the existence of family dependents within the
state.51
In general, most statutory exemption provisions have created more
problems than they have solved. Since most legislatures contemplated
garnishment of a weekly salary, the application of exemptions to a
periodic wage at intervals in excess of one week has given rise to con-
siderable litigation.5 - Another problem arises in the determination of the
class of plaintiffs who may garnish and the class of debtors whose wages
may be garnished.53 For example, due process of law considerations have
47. For the Nixon Welfare Plan, see N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1969, at 10, cols. 1-6.
48. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 690.11 (West Supp. 1968); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 77-13-4
(Supp. 1969); 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 62, § 73 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2715.30 (Baldwin Supp. 1968).
49. Ga. Code Ann. § 46-208 (1965); Hawaii Rev. Stat. ch. 652-1 (1968); 111. Ann. Stat.
ch. 62, § 73 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); Iowa Code Ann. § 627.10 (Supp. 1969); Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 427.010 (Supp. 1968); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 246, § 32(Eigbth) (Supp. 1968);
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-5816 (Replacement 1964); Neb. Rev. Stat § 25-1558 (1964);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231 (1963); NJ). Cent. Code § 32-09-02 (Supp. 1969); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2715.30 (Baldwin Supp. 1968); Va. Code Ann. § 34-29 (Supp. 1969); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 7,32.280 (Supp. 1968).
50. Creditors in certain tort claims, especially in defamation and breach of promse
to marry, are often ineligible to garnish. See Annots., 35 AL.Rd 1443 (1954); 93 A.L.R.
1088 (1934); 91 A.L.R. 1337 (1934). Lenders at usurious interest are ineligible to garnish.
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20:32 (1969).
51. Ark. Const. art. 9, § 2; Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 690.11 (West Supp. 1968); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 222.11 (1961); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2310 (Supp. 1968); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 427.010
(Supp. 1968); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 575.05 (1947); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-5816 (Re-
placement 1964); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090 (1967); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-362 (1953); NJ.
Cent. Code § 32-09-02 (Supp. 1969); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 31, § 1(16) (Supp. 1969); S.D.
Code § 33.2404 (Supp. 1960); Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-17 (Supp. 1969).
52. Abrahams & Feldman, The Exemption of Wages from Garnishment: Some Compar-
isons and Comments, 3 De Paul L. Rev. 153, 156 (1954).
53. There may be no attachment of merchant seamen and fishermen's wages due or
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long restricted a state's jurisdiction to garnish in cases where the state
had no personal jurisdiction over the employer. 4 This limitation, how-
ever, can have unhappy consequences for corporations doing business in
several states. 5 If wage garnishment must continue, a possible solution
would be to require that both the employer and employee be residents
of the same state.50 Troublesome problems have arisen because of statu-
tory provision in some western states that extends the garnishment
exemptions only to the common necessities of life.5T While this article
does not purport to deal with these problems, it should be noted that
were wage garnishment to be eliminated entirely, as proposed here, the
problems would perforce be resolved.
accruing, except for support of wife or children. 46 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. IV, 1969). Wages of
federal employees are exempt from state garnishment. Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. (4
How.) 20 (1846). See 40 U.S.C. § 308 (Supp. IV, 1969). But see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2710-17 (1964).
Some states may not permit garnishee actions against the state as garnishee. See Annot., 114
A.L.R. 261 (1938).
54. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); see
Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924) ; Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 420, 437 (1950).
55. See Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Hall, 229 U.S. 511 (1913). An insolvent Nebraska work-
man was temporarily in Iowa where he was served with process and his wages garnished.
Within four months he returned to Nebraska and was adjudicated bankrupt. Nebraska law
forbade wage garnishment whereas Iowa permitted it. The workman, having claimed his
wages as exempt assets, was discharged in bankruptcy. Subsequently he brought a Nebraska
action to recover the wages garnished in Iowa. The Supreme Court held that all the
bankrupt's property including the exempt wages passed to the trustee who had power to set
such property apart for the bankrupt. The railroad, therefore, was liable to its employee for
the wages garnished in Iowa.
Wages of non-resident wage earners which can be found within the state by service on
the employer are subject to garnishment. See Annot., 26 A.L.R. 180 (1923). At the same
time the exemption statutes of many states are available only for residents: Ark. Const.
art. 9, § 2; Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 690.11 (West Supp. 1968); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4913
(1953); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 222.11 (1961) ; Idaho Code Ann. § 11-205 (1948) ; Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-2310 (Supp. 1968); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 427.010 (Supp. 1968); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 525.030
(1953); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-5816 (Replacement 1964); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 21.090
(1967); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 26-2-27 (1953); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-09-02 (Supp. 1969);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 31 § 1(16) (Supp. 1969).
56. See Brown v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 53 Misc. 2d 182, 278 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1967),
holding that the New York income execution statute cannot reach the wages of a non-
resident not employed in New York although the garnishee was a resident there. But see
Oystermen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Manning, 59 Misc. 2d 144, 298 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Sup. Ct.
1969).
57. See Brunn, supra note 41, at 1216. See also Abrahams & Feldman, supra note 52,
at 166.
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IV. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION TESTS
In one of its first decisions in the field of consumer protection, the
Supreme Court held58 that Wisconsin's Wage Garnishment Statutea per-
mitting creditors to obtain pre-judgment garnishment of wages uncon-
stitutionally deprived debtors of procedural due process of law under the
fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This decision can be
extended to the laws of sixteen other states which permit the practice."
In Sniadack v. Family Finance Corp.,2 the plaintiff finance company
had begun an action on a promissory note alleging damages in the
amount of $420.00. Prior to judgment in the action on the note, plaintiff
filed a sworn statement that defendant was in default on a debt and
served the defendant and her employer with a garnishee summons and
complaint,"a thereby requiring the employer to pay $31.59 of the debtor's
available wages of $63.18 to the court pending further order.
58. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 US. 337 (1969).
59. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 267.18(2) (a) (Supp. 1969) provides that "[wjhen manes or salary are
the subject of garnishment action, the garnishee shall pay over to the principal defendant on
the date when such wages or salary would normally be payable a subsistence alloance,
out of the wages or salary then owing, in the sum of $25 in the case of an individual
without dependents or W in the case of an individual with dependents; but in no event
in excess of 50 per cent of the wages or salary owing. Said subsistence allowance shall
be applied to the first wages or salary earned in the period subject to said garnishment
action."
60. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 US. 337, 341-42 (1969): "The result is that
a prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type may as a practical matter drive a wage-
earning family to the wall. Where the taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs
no extended argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior hearing this prejudgment
garnishment procedure violates the fundamental principles of due process." (Citation
omitted). Wage garnishment is essentially a problem in federal-state relations under the
fourteenth amendment since garnishment in the federal courts is employed in accordance
with the procedures of the state where the federal court is sitting. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(d)(2), 4(d)(6), 4(d)(7), 4(e), 64 (1968). Cf. Big Vein Coal Co. v. Read, 229 US. 31
(1913). See also Currie, Attachment and Garnishment in the Federal Courts, 59 Mich.
L. Rev. 337 (1961).
61. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wyoming.
62. 395 US. 337 (1969).
63. This case does not involve problems of "sewer service" whereby the consumer debtor
is never in fact notified of the initial action, or of the garnishment proceeding, because the
summons has not in fact been served by the process server, who has sworn to a false affidavit
of service. See Note, Abuse of Process: Sewer Service, 3 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Problems
17 (1967). N.Y. Penal Law §§ 210.33, 210.40 (1967) create the offensm of making an
apparently false sworn statement. See also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5251 (Supp. 1969). New York law
requires that the garnishee be given 20 days notice that his wages shall be attached. N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5231(d) (1963).
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the pre-judgment wage gar-
nishment did not deprive the debtor of due process because the remedy
provided for both notice and a hearing at some stage in the process.
Furthermore, the choice of an appropriate remedy for creditors was a
legislative function.64 The dissent felt that the fundamental unfairness of
pre-judgment garnishment was in its actual application, and this had
been ignored by the majority. Moreover, this unfairness should not be
rationalized by legislative freedom of action nor mitigated by the faint
possibility of a malicious prosecution action.65
The Supreme Court adopted much of the reasoning of the Wisconsin
dissent. It is interesting to note that in his concurring opinion Justice
Harlan found a deprivation of defendant's property in the "use" of the
garnished portion of her wages during the interim period between the
garnishment and the culmination of the main suit.60
The decision that pre-judgment wage garnishment violates due process,
however, does not appear to affect the validity of earlier Supreme Court
decisions that post-judgment wage garnishment can meet constitutional
standards of notice and hearing. 67 Nevertheless, the attack against wage
64. Family Fin. Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1967), rev'd, 395
U.S. 337 (1969). In his dissent to the Supreme Court's opinion, Justice Black viewed the use
of the due process clause to disapprove the state's garnishment policy as inhumane to be "a
plain, judicial usurpation of state legislative power to decide what the State's laws shall be."
395 U.S. at 345. Although justice Black does not cite prior opinions, this view is in accord
with his concurrence in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) and his dissent In
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947). See H. Black, A Constitutional Faith (1969).
65. Family Fin. Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 183-86, 154 N.W.2d 259, 270-71
(1967), rev'd, 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
66. 395 U.S. at 342.
67. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U.S. 28S (1924). But see
Hanner v. DeMarcus, 390 U.S. 736 (1968), dismissing as improvidently granted a writ of
certiorari to review the due process implications of a sheriff's sale of property without
notice, although pursuant to judgment and execution. Dissenting, Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Black and Douglas questioned the continuing validity of the 1924 Endicott
Johnson decision. "Since the Endicott decision, there has been not only an expansion of
the scope of the notice requirement itself ...but a new approach to the constitutional
sufficiency of the means of giving notice in particular types of cases ...
"The Endicott rationale that a party who has litigated a case and had a judgment taken
against him is deemed, for purposes of due process, to be on notice of further pro-
ceedings in the same action was rejected in Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220. There the wife
won a divorce from her husband in 1926 and an award of $3,000 per year alimony. In
1938, without notifying her ex-husband, the debtor, she obtained a judgment for alimony
arrears and a writ of execution. Under the applicable New York law, the husband could
have defeated liability for the accrued arrearage by proof, for example, that the wife had
remarried or of change of circumstances, such as comparative financial status, warranting
retroactive modification of the alimony award.
"We held failure to givs pct ul notice to the husband of the 1938 proceedings violated
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garnishment on constitutional grounds may be expected to continue,
based on an equal protection argument.0 8
The essence of the equal protection argument is that a wage garnish-
ment statute is unreasonable class legislation on its face; that is, the
weapon coerces only the worker near the poverty level. c9
An attempt to raise the equal protection and due process arguments
was unsuccessfully made in New Mexico in 1968.70 Defendant, operator
of a collection agency, acquired various accounts against plaintiffs,
husband and wife, totalling $525.00 for small claims; defendant de-
manded a settlement of $448.00 in cash. When plaintiff could not raise
the necessary funds, defendant began wage garnishment proceedings. This
situation presented consumer groups the opportunity to challenge the con-
stitutionality of wage garnishment statutes71 before a three-judge federal
due process, saying: 'While it is undoubtedly true that the 1926 decree, taken with the
New York practice on the subject, gave petitioner notice at the time of its entry that further
proceedings might be taken to docket in judgment form the obligation to pay installments
accruing under the decree, we find in this no ground for saying that due process does not
require further notice of the time and place of such further proceedings, inasmuch as they
undertook substantially to affect his rights in ways in which the 1926 decree did not.' . ..
"Does not Griffin point the way to the demands of due process in the instant case? The
further proceedings in Mrs. Hanner's case-execution and judicial sale--certainly 'under-
took substantially to affect [her] rights.' . . . [In the instant case substantial property
rights were at stake because state law gave the debtor the right to select the property to
be levied on . . . ." 390 U.S. at 741-42. (emphasis omitted).
68. See Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606, 609 (D.N.M. 1968) (dissenting opinion). See
also Family Fin. Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 178, 154 N.W.2d 259, 267 (1967) (dis-
senting opinion).
69. See 114 Cong. Rec. 1833 (1968) (speech by Representative Henry Gonzalez): "For
a poor man-and whoever heard of the wage of the affluent being attached?-to lose part
of his salary often means his family will go without the essentials. No man sits by while
his family goes hungry or without heat. He either files for consumer bankruptcy and
tries to begin again, or just quits his job and goes on relief."
Judge Patterson, in discussing prejudgment garnishments, has concluded that, "Every
day people are losing their jobs because of this procedure and because of employers'
attitudes toward it. These evils turn what was initially intended as an extraordinary remedy
into a systematically applied weapon for collection totally destructive of all rights of
defendants in the collector's court." Patterson, Forward: Wage Garnishment-An Extra-
ordinary Remedy Run Amuck, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 735, 739 (1968).
70. Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606, 607 (D.N.M. 1968).
71. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 26-2-1 (1953): The clerks of the several district courts of the
state of New Mexico may issue writs of garnishment returnable to their respective courts
in the following cases: (1) In any case where an original attachment may be issued as
provided by the attachment laws of the state of New Mexico; (2) Where the plaintiff in
any suit sues for a debt and he or someone for him makes [an] affidavit that such debt is
just, due and unpaid, and that the defendant has not within his knowledge property in
his possession within this state subject to execution sufficient to satisfy such debt; and
that the garnishment applied for is not sued out to injure either the defendant or the
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court.72
Disposing quickly of the due process argument, the court noted that
defendant had a valid judgment against plaintiff before instituting a wage
garnishment proceeding. 73 Therefore, the debtor had already received
ample notice and a sufficient opportunity to defend in the principal
action, thus meeting the tests set up by the Supreme Court in Endicott
Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc.,74 which involved an almost
identical provision of New York law. Plaintiffs alleged that the statutes
discriminated unreasonably on the basis of wealth, nature of assets and
employment. Therefore, they argued, it discriminated against wage earn-
ers as a class since the wage earner was not entitled to have a $500
garnishee. (3) Where the plaintiff has a judgment against the defendant in some court of
the state and he or someone for him makes [an] affidavit that the defendant has not within
his knowledge property in his possession within the state subject to execution sufficient
to satisfy such judgment. (§ 26-2-1 has been replaced by § 26-2-1 (Supp. 1969)).
§ 24-6-7: Family head not owning homestead-Additional exemption-Limitation in case
of necessities and manual labor.-Any resident of this state, who is the head of a family and
not the owner of a homestead, may hold exempt from levy and sale, real or personal
property, to be selected by such person, his agent or attorney, at any time before sale not
exceeding five hundred dollars [$500] in value in addition to the amount of chattel prop-
erty otherwise by law exempted; Provided, however, that no exemption other than eighty
per cent (80%) of the first seventy-five dollars ($75.00) of the earnings of the debtor for
the thirty (30) days next prior to the service of writ of garnishment shall be allowed under
the provisions of this section where the debt sued on was incurred for the necessities of life
furnished the debtor or his family, or for manual labor. (§ 24-6-7 has been replaced by
§ 24-6-7 (Supp. 1969)).
§ 26-2-27: Wages of head of resident family partially exempt-Exceptions.-No person
shall be charged as garnishee, in any court in this state, on account of current wages, or
salary due, from him to a defendant, in his employ, for more than twenty per cent [20%],
of any wages or salary, due such defendant, for the last thirty [30] days' service, unless
the wages or salary due, said defendant exceeds seventy-five dollars [$75.00) per month,
garnishment may be had, for twenty per cent [20%] of seventy-five dollars [$75.00], of
such wages and salary, and, in addition thereto, for full amount of the excess of such wages,
or salary above seventy-five dollars [$75.00]. No exemption whatever shall be claimed, under
the provisions of this section, where the debt was incurred, for necessities of life, or for any
debt, in either of the following cases. In case the debtor is not the head of a family, or in
case, the debtor is the head of a family, where the family does not reside in this state.
§ 26-2-27 has been repealed).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1964).
73. Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606, 608 (D.N.M. 1968).
74. 266 U.S. 285 (1924). See also Kansas ex rel. Beck v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 95
F.2d 935, 937 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 603 (1938) ; South Fla. Trust Co. v. Miami
Coliseum Corp., 101 Fla. 1351, 1357, 133 So. 334, 337 (1931); Labozetta v. District Court,
200 Iowa 1339, 1342, 206 N.W. 139, 140 (1925); Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Myrtle
Grove Syrup Co., 175 La. 969, 982, 144 So. 730, 734 (1932); Commercial Nat'l Trust &
Say. Bank v. Hamilton, 101 N.J. Eq. 249, 251, 137 A. 403, 404 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927) ; First
Nat'I Bank v. Knight, 127 Okla. 20, 27, 259 P. 565, 570 (1927); Rosandich v. Chicago,
N. S. & M. R.R., 185 Wis. 184, 188, 201 N.W. 391, 392 (1924).
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exemption 7 applied to his total wages in the same manner in which such
an exemption may be applied against the total assets of non-wage earn-
ers.7' The majority found the legislative purpose in the exemption statute
to be reasonable as relevant to the purpose for which the classification
C"wage earner" was made. The court considered that most wage earners
do not earn more than $500, and if they were permitted to apply the
$500 exemption to their wages, then no wages would be subject to
garnishment. Thus the exclusion of wage earners from the exemption
prevented the specific purpose of the garnishment statute from being
thwarted. 7 Noting that there is no constitutional prohibition against
classification legislation where the distinctions are relevant to the purpose
of the classification,"8 the majority held that a court may not declare a
statute unconstitutional solely upon the ground that it is unjust and op-
pressive and works hardship on the poor. 79 With respect to the adminis-
tration of the exemption statute, the majority saw no equal protection
problem since the statute was not self-executing, the debtor being re-
quired to file a claim of exemption and demand a hearing in order to
recover exempted wages. 0
The dissent, noting the complex and lengthy procedure for establishing
the claimed exemption, uncertainty as to the time period within which
the debtor could claim his exemption, and the considerable delays before
the exempted portion could be released,"' found a violation of equal pro-
tection in the administration of the garnishment statutes. He concluded
that the statutes "set up a veritable obstacle course through which a
bewildered, often ignorant, and almost always impoverished, debtor must
pick his way in order to attain the expressed public policy of the state
that he is to have certain safeguards and protections for his and his fam-
fly's economic well-being . . 2 These complicated and unreasonable
procedures hindering the debtor in the exercise of his rights, in fact,
protect the creditors' interest instead of the debtors' for whom the statute
was supposedly designed.
Future judicial attacks on wage garnishment statutes should concen-
trate on the practical administration of the statutes. 3 But beyond these
75. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1964).
76. Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606, 608-09 (D.N.M. 1968).
77. Id. at 609.
78. Id., citing Rinaldi v. Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
79. Id., citing Fisch v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 902 (1949).
80. Id. at 608-09.
81. Id. at 610.
82. Id. at 613.
83. See rick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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traditional arguments, there may be a fundamental and personal right
to work to support one's family free from harassment, 4 secreted in the
interstices of due process, equal protection, and the commerce and bank-
ruptcy clauses and manifested in the federal and state policies on full
employment, racial discrimination, and welfare.8
84. Cf. the right of marital privacy discovered in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965). See generally Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Funda-
mental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 235 (1965); McKay
The Right of Privacy, Emanations and Intimations, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 259 (1965); Suther-
land, Privacy in Connecticut, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 283 (1965). Denial of Equal Protection by
discriminating against the poor in wage garnishment laws might be developed from the
following cases: Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961): Iowa statute requiring an indigent
prisoner to pay a fee for a writ of habeas corpus ($4) on the allowance of his appeal;
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956): Illinois must provide transcripts of trial for indigents
of appellate review where transcripts supplied to those who paid fee; Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963): California must provide counsel for indigents at appellate stages
where review is of right; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966): Virginia
poll tax excluding those unable to pay from voting held to be unconstitutional. See also
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison
Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Note, Discriminations Against The Poor and The
Fourteenth Amendment, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 435 (1967). An example of the obstacle course for
bewildered, ignorant and impoverished debtors may be found in Michigan: where defendant
is a householder with a family, indebtedness for personal labor of defendant or his family is
exempt from garnishment to the extent of 60% thereof, subject to the following maximum
and minimum exemptions: (a) on first garnishment issued in the case, $50 and $30 on wages
for labor of one week or less, $90 and $60 on wages for more than one week; (b) on sub-
sequent garnishments $30 and $12 on wages for one week or less, $60 and $24 on wages for
one week through 16 days, $60 and $30 on wages for more than 16 days. Exemption for
any other defendant is 40% (maximum $50; minimum $20) on first garnishment issued In
case and 30% (maximum $20; minimum $10) on subsequent garnishments. Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 600.7511 (1968).
85. The Employment Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-24 (1964), placed the responsibility
for achieving full employment and fighting inflation on private enterprise and the federal
government.
"The Congress declares that it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal
Government to use all practicable means consistent with its needs and obligations and
other essential considerations of national policy, . . . to coordinate and utilize all its plans,
functions, and resources for the purpose of creating and maintaining, in a manner calculated
to foster and promote free competitive enterprise and the general welfare, conditions under
which there will be afforded useful employment opportunities, including self-employment,
for those able, willing, and seeking to work. . . ." Id. § 1021. But see M. Harrington, The
Accidental Century 299 (1965). See also Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e-2) (a)
(1965): full employment will be available to all regardless of race, color, religion, or national
origin. Finally, see Article 23, Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved by the
General Assembly of the United Nations Dec. 10, 1948. 3 U.N. GAOR, 1 Res. at 71-77,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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V. NEW YORK'S WAGE GARNISHMENT LAW
Garnishment of wages in New York can be traced back to the Field
Code (1848).6 Legislative modification occurred in the 1876 Code of
Civil Procedure8 7 and the 90%o salary exemption was added in 1908.8
New York's Civil Practice Act (CPA) developed wage garnishment as
the principal creditors' remedy,"9 although there were costly defects.
Under the CPA, the judgment creditor had to apply for a court order
which would issue upon recital by affidavit that the creditor had a judg-
ment unsatisfied by attempted personal property execution, and that
the wages to be levied upon amounted to at least $12 per week. Without
requiring further notice to the debtor, the court would order a levy upon
wages presently due and to become due, but not to exceed the ten per
cent of the gross wages.90
The drafters of the New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules (CPLR),
enacted in 1963, had intended to abolish wage garnishment as such,"1
substituting therefor the depression legislation permitting creditors to
obtain court orders fixing the payment of judgments by installments. 0 2
The CPLR refers to income execution and would on its face appear to
foreclose any attempts at pre-judgment wage garnishment, condemned in
the Sniadach case.93 Under the language of the statute it could also be
86. 1848 C.P. §§ 289-90 (1848).
87. C.C.P. § 1366 (1876).
88. Laws of April 22, 1908, ch. 433, § 1, [1908] N.Y. Laws 433.
89. N.Y. C.P.A. § 684.
90. See State Tax Comm'n v. Voges, 144 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1955) (wage garnishment by
public authority properly based on gross salary and not "take-home" pay after withholdings).
91. See Third Report, Leg. Doc. No. 17, Rule 61.5(a) (1959). Income Execution
reappears in the Fifth Report, Leg. Doc. No. 15, Rule 5255 (1961).
92. N.Y. C.P.A. § 793, now enacted as N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5226 (1963). "Upon motion
of the judgment creditor, upon notice to the judgment debtor, where it is shown that
the judgment debtor is receiving or will receive money from any source, or is attempting
to impede the judgment creditor by rendering services without adequate compensation,
the court shall order that the judgment debtor make specified installment payments to
the judgment creditor. Notice of the motion shall be -erved on the judgment debtor
in the same manner as a summons or by registered or certified mail, return receipt re-
quested. In fixing the amount of the payments, the court shall take into consideration
the reasonable requirements of the judgment debtor and his dependents, any payments
required to be made by him or deducted from the money he would otherwse receive
in satisfaction of other judgments and wage assignments, the amount due on the judg-
ment, and the amount being or to be received, or, if the judgment debtor is attempting
to impede the judgment creditor by rendering services without adequate compensation,
the reasonable value of the services rendered."
93. But see Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 296 N.Y.S2d 783, 244 N.E2d 259
(1968). Pre-judgment garnishment was possible under C.P.A. § 684, although the amount
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argued that only net income can be levied upon.14 The statute does not
contemplate the necessity of a court order to effect the garnishment. The
creditor, however, is required to serve the debtor with a notice that "he
[the debtor] shall commence payment of the installments specified to the
sheriff forthwith and that, upon his default, the execution will be served
upon [the employer] ."5 The debtor is given a twenty-day period to make
the installment payment before service upon the employer can be made."
There have been problems regarding the meaning of the word "earn-
ings" in the CPA and the CPLR; for example, tips -received by a
restaurant waitress were not considered earnings 7 while bonuses payable
to a professional football player, contingent on general good perfor-
mance and participation in an agreed number of scheduled games, could
be reached and pro-rated to the pay periods for which the income execu-
tion was applicable. Advances paid to salesmen working on commission
have created a problem where the "advances . . . continually outpace
commissions earned""0 so as to immunize the salary from execution by
creditors; nevertheless, it is possible to go behind the form of the employ-
ment contract to reach such advances as wages.1°°
Since the law permits execution on only 10% of the earnings at any
one time,' the New York scheme contemplates that the judgment of
one creditor at a time will be satisfied by wage garnishment. 10 2 As there
may be a rush by creditors to obtain garnishment when accident or illness
causes delay in payments, priority is determined by the time of delivery
of the income execution order to the sheriff of the county of debtor's
residence or employment. 0 3 Of course, once the employee has used the
could not be paid over until judgment. Morris Plan Indus. Bank v. Gunning, 295 N.Y. 324,
67 N.E.2d 510 (1946).
94. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(d) (1963); see County Trust Co. v. Duerr, 52 Misc. 2d 411,
275 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
95. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(a) (1963).
96. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(d) (1963).
97. Orgurchak v. Merrill, 178 Misc. 872, 36 N.Y.S.2d 29 (App. T. 1942) (N.Y. C.P.A.
§ 684).
98. Girard Trust Bank v. Gotham Football Club, 31 App. Div. 2d 142, 295 N.Y.S.2d
741 (1st Dep't 1968).
99. Larry Goldwater, Inc. v. C.B. Snyder Nat'l Realty Co., 48 Misc. 2d 669, 672,
265 N.Y.S.2d 542, 546 (Civ. Ct. 1965).
100. Id.
101. Shambach v. General Electric Co., 6 App. Div. 2d 327, 176 N.Y.S.2d 888 (3rd
Dep't 1958) (N.Y. C.P.A. § 684).
102. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(h) (1963). The judgment will be satisfied in full (evidenced by
Sheriff's return) before other creditors may execute. Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Rayno Dis-
trib., Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 651, 252 N.Y.S.2d 123 (App. T. 1964). See also Spatz Furniture Corp.
v. Lee Letter Service, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 291, 276 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Civ. Ct. 1966).
103. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(h) (1963); see Schwartz v. Goldberg, 58 Misc. 2d 308, 295
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90% exempt wages to purchase non-exempt personalty or realty,10 ' the
creditor may execute on that property.
The judgment creditor obtains an interest in the nature of a lien on
unpaid wages at the time the order is served on the employer as well as a
cause of action against the employer with respect to the 10% available
for execution. Thus, the employer who mistakenly pays the full wage to
his employee is liable to the judgment creditor for such mistake."e
It should be noted that at the present time the New York Legislature
is considering a repeal of New York's garnishment statute.0 0
VI. GARNIsMENT AND LIQUIDATION BANKRUPTCY' °7
Assuming that a wage garnishment order, valid under state law, has
been served on the debtor and his employer, the debtor can obtain relief
therefrom by filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy' and obtaining
a stay order'0 9 against the employer, the creditor, or the creditor's attor-
ney if the judgment is dischargeable."!0 Until service of the stay order,
N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Ct. 1968). Priority in executing on personalty is determined by the time of
delivery of the execution writ to the Sheriff of the county where located (N.Y. C.P.L.R.
532(b)) whereas priority in executing on realty is determined by the time of docketing
the judgment in the county where the realty is located (N.Y. C.PJL.R. 5203(a)).
104. Exemptions of personalty, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205; realty, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5206.
105. Royal Business Funds Corp. v. Rooster Plastics, Inc., 53 Mbsc. 2d 181, 278
N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Rayno Distrib., Inc., 43 Misc.
2d 651, 252 N.Y.S.2d 123 (App. T. 1964).
106. See N.Y.J., July 11, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
107. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-112 (1964), as amended (Supp. IV, 1969).
108. 11 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1964). A "wage earner" making less than 1500 dollars per year
may not be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt. §§ 1, 22(b). The delivery of a garnishment
order creating a lien on wages may be an act of bankruptcy leading to an involuntary
adjudication. § 21(a)(3). See Julius S. Cohn & Co. v. Drennan, 19 F.2d 642 (E.D. La.
1927); In re Mayhew, 31 F. Supp. 175 (D. Md. 1940). The garnishing creditor may be
estopped from acting as petitioning creditor. In re Maryanov, 20 F.2d 939 (E.D.N.Y.
1927).
109. 11 U.S.C. § 29(a) (1964). "A suit which is founded upon a claim from which a
discharge would be a release, and which is pending against a person at the time of the
filing of a petition by or against him, shall be stayed until an adjudication or the dis-
missal of the petition; if such person is adjudged bankrupt, such action may be further
stayed until the question of his discharge is determined ... ?I See In re Prunotto, S1 F2d
602 (W.D.N.Y. 1931); In re Obergfoll, 239 F. 850 (2d Cir. 1917); In re Beck, 238 F.
653 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); In re Harrington, 200 F. 1010 (N.D.N.Y. 1912); In re Sims, 176 F.
645 (S.D.N.Y. 1910); In re Van Buren, 164 F. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1908); In re Smith, 8 F.
Supp. 49 (W.D.N.Y. 1934); In re Racki, 8 F. Supp. 526 (W.D.N.Y. 1934).
110. All claims against the debtor as of the day of filing bankruptcy which are made
provable by § 103 of the Bankruptcy Act are discharged except those which are not
eligible for discharge, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (Supp. IV, 1969), or not allowable by reason of
impossible liquidation (§ 93); § 103 makes provable those claims which are listed in the
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the bankrupt's employer must comply with the garnishment order;,
however, the creditor who receives garnished wages with knowledge of
the bankruptcy after filing by the petitioner can be required to turn over
such amount to the trustee.1 2
The debtor having been adjudicated bankrupt, the trustee may com-
pel the creditor to turn over garnished wages under the provisions of the
preferential lien section of the Bankruptcy Act."" That statute requires
that a lien on specific property be obtained by legal or equitable pro-
ceedings."1 4 Accordingly, where the state law permits garnishment only
of wages presently due, the trustee may set aside garnishments of an
insolvent 1' for the period of four months prior to filing the petition.11 '
Consequently, where the garnishment lien has attached to specific wages
more than four months prior to bankruptcy it may not be set aside." '
bankrupt's schedules. The discharge, of course, relates back to the day of filing the
petition. See generally Brenen v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 189 App. Div. 685, 178 N.Y.S.
846 (lst Dep't 1919); Refrigeration & Air Conditioning Institute v. Imperato, 187 Misc.
405, 62 N.Y.S.2d 357 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1946); Weinstein v. Strubble, 142 Misc. 575, 255
N.Y.S. 354 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1932).
111. Matter of Palter, 151 F. Supp. 278 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); see In re Smith, 8 F. Supp.
49 (W.D.N.Y. 1934). See also Germana v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 56 Misc. 2d 572, 289
N.Y.S.2d 120 (Albany City Ct. 1968).
112. In re Lincks Wire Forming Co., 60 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1932); Schrepel v. Davis,
283 F. 29 (8th Cir. 1922). The trustee may also recover wages paid into court under a
garnishment order. In re Wilks, 196 F. Supp. 640 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
113. 11 U.S.C. § 10 (1964):
"Every lien against the property of a person obtained by attachment, judgment, levy, or
other legal or equitable process or proceedings within four months before the filing of a
petition initiating a proceeding under this title by or against such person shall be deemed
null and void (a) if at the time when such lien was obtained such person was insolvent
or (b) if such lien was sought and permitted in fraud of the provisions of this title. .... .
114. Liens by garnishment are included within 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1964), as set forth In
Crane v. Wikle, 298 F.2d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1961). See generally Metcalf v. Barker, 187
U.S. 165 (1902).
115. Professor Kripke has pointed out that most wage earners cannot pass the bank-
ruptcy test of insolvency (assets less than liabilities, 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1964)). Krlpke,
Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1 (1969).
116. In re Prunotto, 51 F.2d 602 (W.D.N.Y. 1931); In re Beck, 238 F. 653 (S.D.N.Y.
1915); In re Ludelke, 171 F. 292 (E.D.N.Y. 1909); cf. In re Wodzicki, 238 F. 571 (S.D.N.Y.
1916) ; In re Sims, 176 F. 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1910). See also In re Rubins, 74 F.2d 432 (7th Cir.
1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 758 (1935).
117. In re Beck, 238 F. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); In re Smith, 8 F. Supp. 49 (W.D.N.Y. 1934).
See also United States Rubber Co. v. Poage, 297 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1962); McLeod v.
Cooper, 88 F.2d 194 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 705 (1937); Morris W. Haft &
Bros., Inc. v. Wells, 93 F.2d 991 (10th Cir. 1937) ; In re Snitzer, 62 F.2d 285 (7th Cir.
1932); Oilfields Syndicate v. American Improvement Co., 256 F. 979 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd,
260 F. 905 (9th Cir. 1919); In re Neighbor's Food Market, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 433 (N.D.
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Where the state law permits garnishment of prospective wages, as in
New York, the trustee may set it aside." 8 Uncertainty, therefore, has
developed with respect to the inchoate lien created by a pre-judgment
attachment." 9 In addition to these rights, the trustee may set aside wage
garnishment as a preference or as a voidable transfer. -20 Liquidation is
preferable to perpetual garnishment and threat of job loss.
VII. CHAPTER XIII WAGE EARNER PLANS
It is submitted that abolition of the creditor remedy of wage garnish-
ment should not destroy the possibility of the poor or middle class ob-
taining necessary credit. The creditor is not remediless; there will still
remain the traditional rights for the judgment creditor to attach non-
exempt realty or personalty or to obtain involuntary adjudication of
bankruptcy. Of course, the ghetto-dweller seldom has realty and collec-
tion agencies are not interested in used furniture; thus, the creditor can
argue that the traditional execution remedies are worthless.
Congress, however, has given an additional remedy in the Chapter
XIII Wage Earner's Plans.' -' Obviously, there will be some anxiety
among creditors because any remedy under Chapter XIII will have to be
Ohio 1960); In re Boylan, 65 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 157 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1946);
In re Demountable House Corp., 58 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Fla. 1945).
118. In re Barry Industries, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Mich. 1955); In re Unit
Oil Co., 50 F. Supp. 264 (D. Minn. 1943).
119. See In re West Hotel, Inc., 34 F.2d 832 (D. Minn. 1929); Mussman & Riesen-
feld, supra note 20; cf. In re Lesser, 108 F. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1901). Contra, Morris W. Haft
& Bros., Inc. v. Wells, 93 F.2d 991 (10th Cir. 1937).
120. See 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1964); 11 U.S.C. § 110(c), as amended 11 U.S.C. § 110(c)
(Supp. IV, 1969). See also Adler v. Greenfield, 83 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1936).
121. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-86 (1964), as amended (Supp. IV, 1969). For general discussions
of Chapter XIII see: Brown, A Primer on Wage-Earner Plans under Chapter XIII of the
Bankruptcy Act, 17 Bus. Law. 682 (1962) ; Chandler, The Wage Earners' Plan: Its Purpose,
15 Vand. L. Rev. 169 (1961); Countryman, Proposed New Amendments for Chapter XIII,
22 Bus. Law. 1151 (1967); Hilliard & Hurt, Wage Earner Plans under Chapter XIII of
The Bankruptcy Act, 19 Bus. Law. 271 (1963); MacLachlan, Puritanical Therapy for Wage
Earners, 68 Comm. L.J. 87 (1963); McDuffee, The Wage Earner's Plan in Practice, 15
Vand. L. Rev. 173 (1961); Meth, Filling The Gaps in The Law of Consumer Bankruptcy,
23 Bus. Law. 173 (1967); Nadler, The Problem of the Insolvent Wage Earner, 67 Comm.
LJ. 65 (1962); Twinem, American Bar Association Approves Proposed Amendment to Bank-
ruptcy Act, 19 Pers. Fin. L.Q. 109 (1964); Woodbridge, Wage Earners' Plans in The Federal
Courts, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 775 (1942); Comment, Wage Earners' Plans-Chapter XII, 45
Marq. L. Rev. 582 (1962); Comment, The Problem of Consumer Bankruptcy: Is Amendment
of The Bankruptcy Act The Answer?, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 1449 (1965); Comment, Emergence
of The Wage Earner's Plan, 4 Santa Clara Law. 72 (1963); Comment, Should Chapter XIII
Bankruptcy Be Involuntary?, 44 Texas L. Rev. 533 (1966); Note, Relief for The Wage
Earning Debtor: Chapter XIII, or Private Debt Adjustment?, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 372 (1960).
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weighed against the debtors' substantive and procedural rights therein;
a right to be protected from usurious loans,'22 finance company de-
fenses,' 23 unconscionable agreements, 24 wage garnishments, 2  and loss
of employment by reason thereof. 26 Thus, ghetto credit practices might
be subjected to a close and searching inquiry, while legitimate credit
sources should have nothing to fear. Yet, this important legislation re-
mains a dead-letter in many federal districts. 27 The first step toward
abolition of wage garnishment must be education of the bar, the bank-
ruptcy referees, and the public as to the benefits available from this
progressive legislation, first enacted as part of the 1938 Chandler Act.
28
This is not to expect the impossible from the existing bankruptcy court
structure. Surely additional clerical personnel, computer leasing time and
additional referees will be needed to effectuate congressional intent. In
urban industrial centers there should be wage earner referees specifically
trained in debt counselling.
The purpose of Chapter XIII is to enable the debtor wage earner to
make payment in full out of future earnings looking to rehabilitation
rather than liquidation. Congress, however, recognized that full payment
may not always be possible without undue hardship or economic waste;
therefore, there are several types of plans available:
(1) Extension of time to make full payment. This method enjoys a
privileged status in that confirmation of this type plan is not considered
122. Cope v. Aetna Finance Co., 412 F.2d 635 (lst Cir. 1969) ; In re Began, 281 F. Supp.
242 (W.D. Tenn. 1968); In re Perry, 272 F. Supp. 73 (D. Maine 1967).
123. See Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
124. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
125. In re Potts, 142 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1944); In re Freeman, 49 F. Supp. 163 (S.D.
Ga. 1943); cf. Reed v. General Fin. Loan Co., 394 F.2d 509 (4th Cir. 1968).
126. In re Jackson, 290 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. I1. 1968).
127. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1968, at 73, col. 1-3, 74, col. 6-7. 42 Wage Earner Plans were
filed in New York as opposed to 7000 straight bankruptcies whereas 8000 Wage Earner
Plans were filed in Birmingham, Alabama as opposed to 2296 straight bankruptcies. The
Birmingham District uses computerized operations. It is reported that a Kansas City
organization, Electronic Processing, Inc., with a leased computer handles 12,700 plans for
referees in ten states. See also Sloan, Wage Earners' Plan, 33 Ref. J. 5 (1959). Nationwide
only about 9% of all bankrupts are businesses, the remainder being principally voluntary
bankruptcies by individuals. Of all the filings in straight bankruptcy 90% of the estates
have no assets. See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts (1968). Thus, the Wage Earner Plan with its provisions for eventual
repayment of all or part of the debt is an acceptable middle way between the total loss
to the creditor under straight bankruptcy and total loss to the debtor under wage
garnishment.
128. 52 Stat. 930 (1938).
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a discharge in bankruptcy for the debtor who has previously obtained a
discharge in bankruptcy within six years.'-'
(2) Composition, whereby the creditors agree to a scaling down of
debts. Confirmation of this type wage earner plan is considered to bar a
bankruptcy discharge within six years within the meaning of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.1 0
(3) The plan may combine both the features of extension and com-
position; however, the presence of the composition in the confirmed plan
will also bar a bankruptcy discharge."' 1
Historical antecedents of the wage earner plan may be seen in volun-
tary arrangement plans for corporations, partnerships and individuals
under Chapter XI; reorganization provisions under the old section 77 of
the Bankruptcy Act; equity reorganizations under the state laws; the
composition and extension provisions of the Third Bankruptcy Act in
1874; and common law compositions.132 In its broadest aspects the
rehabilitation provisions for arrangement plans under Chapter XIII are
similar to the provisions of Chapter XI.133
129. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966). See also In the Matter of
Schlageter, 319 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1963) ; In re Edwards, 73 F. Supp. 312 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
Section 32 of the Bankruptcy Act provides: "The court shall grant the discharge unless
satisfied that the bankrupt.. . in a proceeding under this Act commenced within six years
prior to the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy has been granted a discharge
or had a composition or an arrangement by way of composition or a wage earner's plan
by way of composition confirmed under this Act. .. ." The prior discharge in a Chapter
XIII extension proceeding does not bar discharge in straight bankruptcy within six years.
11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(5); Fishman v. Verlin, 255 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1958); In re Thompson,
51 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Va. 1943).
130. Cf. Webb v. Levin, 374 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1967); Barnes v. Maley, 360 F.2d 922
(7th Cir. 1966) (a Chapter XI Extension Arrangement). See Kennedy, Hospitality for Re-
peaters under The Bankruptcy Act: Recent Developments, 69 Comm. Lj. 213 (1964).
131. CL Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 404 (1966), where the Court,
in referring to the situation of the confirmed wage earner plan for extension of time
where the debtor is unable to complete the plan within three years due to no fault of his
own said: "relief under Section 661 [11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1964)] would, in effect, constitute
an attempt to transpose an extension plan into a composition, and a grant of relief there-
under would, at that time, be tantamount to a confirmation of a composition. The six-year
bar would, therefore, be operative in such a situation."
132. See J. MacLachlan, Bankruptcy §§ 309-11 (1956).
133. Both chapters provide only for voluntary petitions by debtors (ch. XI, § 706(S);
ch. XIII, § 1006(6)), whereas liquidation bankruptcy and Chapter X reorganization may
be brought voluntarily or involuntarily. Neither Chapter XI nor XII permits the plan to
affect security interests in realty. However, the Chapter XIH plan may affect both un-
secured claims and secured claims on personalty, whereas the Chapter XI plan may affect
only unsecured claims (ch. XI, § 707(1); ch. XIII, § 1046(2)); the Chapter X Reorgani-
zation Plan may affect secured and unsecured claims. Nevertheless, Chapter X plans must
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Not the least attractive aspect of Chapter XIII is its informality3 4 and
the fact that it is less expensive than straight bankruptcy.180 As in
straight bankruptcy, law suits and legal action, including wage garnish-
ment, can be stayed until the final decree. 3 Normally, the confirmed plan
must be completed in three years. 37 Statistics, however, indicate that less
than 45 % of the plans are fully completed. 3 If it is obvious that the plan
cannot be effectuated, it should not be confirmed, but rather the proceed-
ing should be converted into a straight bankruptcy. 3 9 Similarly, if the
debtor is unable to comply fully with the plan, through no fault of his
own, three years after confirmation, the court can grant a discharge.14
The plan may provide for the debtor to pay a stated amount weekly
or monthly to the trustee. The courts with the largest volume of Chapter
XIII proceedings, however, consider the most effective method of effec-
tuating the plan to be an order to the employer to pay the debtor's salary
directly to the trustee, who then pays the creditors and the debtor after
determining the needs of the debtor and his family.' 4 '
There is no longer a limitation on the amount of wages or salary neces-
treat all unsecured creditors in the same way: either by extension or composition (§ 1046(1)) ;
whereas Chapter XI plans may divide the unsecured creditors into classes (§§ 756-57). Both
the Chapter XI and the Chapter XIII plans must be approved by a majority In number
and amount of the unsecured creditors whose claims have been provisionally proven and
allowed (ch. XI, § 762; ch. XIII, § 1052). However, since the Chapter XIII plan may
affect secured personal property creditors, there is a further requirement that the plan be
approved by all secured creditors whose claims are "dealt with" by the plan (§ 1052(1)).
See Cheetham v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 390 F.2d 234 (Ist Cir. 1968), holding that a
secured party is not materially and adversely affected by an extension or composition
which restricts his security. See also Terry v. Colonial Stores Employee's Credit Union, 411
F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1969).
134. Chapter XIII plans are referred to the bankruptcy referee rather than the district
judge as in Chapter X.
135. The petition may be filed with the $15 filing fee or the plan itself may provide for
installment payments of the fees. 11 U.S.C. § 1024(2) (1964). There is an additional $15
fee. 11 U.S.C. § 1033(2) (1964). In straight bankruptcy the filing fee is presently $50,
although this may be paid in installments in voluntary bankruptcy.
136. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1014, 1062 (1964).
137. Id. § 1061.
138. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1968, at 74, col. 7.
139. The statute now requires merely that the plan be "for the best interests of the
creditors and [be] feasible ... ." 11 U.S.C. § 1056(a)(2) (1964). Language requiring that
the plan be "fair and equitable" has been repealed. Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 50, 66
Stat. 437, amending Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 656, 52 Stat. 935 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1056 (1964)).
140. 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1964).
141. Id. § 1058. See Rice, The Trustee Under Chapter XIII, 30 Ref. J. 102 (1956).
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sary to qualify as a petitioning wage earner," but the petitioner must
allege that his principal income comes from wages, salary, or commis-
sions 14' and that he is insolvent in either the bankruptcy or equity
sense 44 and desires to effect an extension or composition out of future
earnings. Although Chapter XIII is wholly voluntary it may be used by a
bankruptcy debtor either before or after adjudication in liquidation
bankruptcy, whether it be voluntary or involuntary.45 If arrangement
under Chapter XIII is impossible, a petition originally filed under the
Chapter may be converted into bankruptcy adjudication with the
debtor's consent 46 while petitions converted to Chapter XIII after a
bankruptcy adjudication may revert to liquidation bankruptcy.'*" As
with straight bankruptcy, the wage-earner must list all debts in the
schedules in order to enjoy discharge from such debts as are provable,
allowable, and eligible for discharge. 4 "
The arrangement plan can be filed with the petition but must be sub-
mitted to the scheduled creditors at the first meeting of creditors; 4 the
plan must deal with unsecured debts on equal terms, must submit future
earnings to court control and must provide for modification of the install-
ments.150 Furthermore, the plan may deal with secured debts individually
and on unequal terms of priority or postponement and may reject execu-
tory contracts;' 5' however, any plan which deals with secured creditors
requires their written consent. 52 Nevertheless, this right of secured credi-
tors may be meaningless in view of the referee's power to deny reposses-
sion or foreclosure on the security.
5 3
142. The $5,000 upper limit was repealed by Act of May 13, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-24,
§ 1, 73 Stat. 24 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1006(8) (1964)).
143. 11 U.S.C. § 1006(8) (1964).
144. Bankruptcy insolvency means assets less than liabilities (§ 1(19)) whereas equity
insolvency is defined in Chapter XIII as "[inability] to pay . . .debts as they mature"
(§ 1023); cf. §§ 530 and 723. Contrast N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law § 271 (1945).
145. 11 U.S.C. § 1022 (1964).
146. Id. § 1066(2).
147. Id. § 1066(1).
148. Id. § 1060. "[IThe court shall enter an order discharging the debtor from all his
debts and liabilities provided for by the plan, but 'excluding such debts as are not dis-
chargeable under section 35 of this title held by creditors who have not accepted the plan."
Id.
149. Id. § 1033.
150. Id. § 1046(1), (4), (5).
151. Id. § 1046(2), (3), (6).
152. Id. § 1052(1). See Cheetharn v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 390 F.2d 234 (Ist
Cir. 1968).
153. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1014, 1057 (1964). See In re Duncan, 33 F. Supp. 997 (Ef.. Va.
1940), in which the referee's right to deny reclamation was affirmed where the debtor had
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A majority in number and amount of unsecured creditors must ap-
prove the plan for it to be confirmed by the court.15 4 Once confirmed, the
plan is binding on the debtor and all creditors' and the court will
retain jurisdiction of the debtor, his future wages and his job security.'
VIII. CONCLUSION
The principle argument in favor of the preservation of wage garnish-
ment is that it is essential to the continued growth of the national econ-
omy; the ability to coerce payment from consumers being vital to the
consumer credit industry and economic expansion being contingent upon
the growth of consumer credit. The question whether consumer credit,
monetary policy, or business reinvestment is the triggering factor in
economic growth may be left to the economists,' 57 but the contention that
consumer credit is the most important factor is not provable. That wage
garnishment must be retained in order to coerce dishonest debtors is cer-
tainly a valid argument if it could be shown that there was some deter-
rence therein, but this seems a task similar to proving that capital punish-
ment deterred homicide.
Arguments against wage garnishment may be made at several levels:
(1) It is the precipitating factor in an overwhelming number of volun-
tary bankruptcies; bankruptcy being undesirable for both creditors who
lose everything and debtors who are stigmatized 858 (2) The percentage
of credit to total sales is greater in states with tough garnishment laws
and this represents over-extension by marginal high-risk creditors who
deserve no protection.15 9 (3) It produces excessive economic and social
substantial equity and the secured creditor had acquiesced in prior defaulted installments;
In the Matter of Clevenger, 282 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1960); cf. Hallenbeck v. Penn
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963); In the Matter of Copes, 206 F.
Supp. 329 (D. Kan. 1962). But see In re Pizzolato, 268 F. Supp. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1967),
where the debtor, a practical nurse, needed her car, secured to the creditor, to drive to
work; the petition to reclaim for default in installments was held properly denied in view
of the debtor's substantial equity, the fact that the security (the car) was essential to the
entire plan and there would be no actual impairment of security. See also First Nat'l Bank
v. Cope, 385 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1967).
154. 11 U.S.C. § 1052 (1964).
155. Id. § 1057.
156. Id. § 1058.
157. See J. Galbraith, The New Industrial State 109-27 (1967) ; M. Friedman, Capitalism
& Freedom 37-55 (1962); P. Samuelson, Economics (7th ed. 1967); G. Sullivan, The Boom
in Going Bust 24-26 (1968) ; S. Slichter, Economic Growth in the United States 110-33 (1961).
158. See 2 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 1962 (1968).
159. Cf. Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1,
30 (1969); Project, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical Study, 43 Wash. L.
Rev. 743, 772-73 (1968). But see Brunn, supra note 41, at 1230-41 where it is argued that the
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waste; the legal system bears the cost of collection for the benefit of high-
risk creditors, and those fired by their employers become public charges.
(4) Wage garnishment has a devastating effect on the employment rela-
tion; employers develop a low tolerance to wage garnishment because
they are inconvenienced and risk financial loss. 100 (5) Because of tech-
nological improvements, social insurance and improved security devices,
it is no longer necessary. (6) It is used only against the poor and ignorant
who are the beneficiaries of conflicting social legislation.
These arguments do not conclusively demonstrate the benefits or un-
reasonableness of wage garnishment. Congress, however, in restricting
wage garnishment, believes that there is a correlation between wage
garnishment and the increasing numbers of voluntary bankruptcies,'
but has not as yet followed through to the logical conclusion, abolition of
wage garnishment entirely. More important than the purely economic
arguments is the argument that wage garnishment cripples the employ-
ment relation. Beyond this is the moral argument that it is used chiefly
to coerce the poor and ignorant. For these reasons it should be abolished.
It may be concluded that the existing confusion in the nation's wage
garnishment laws benefit high-risk collection agencies and dishonest
debtors whereas the actual operation of the laws coerces the defenseless.
In his classical study of the low income market, David Caplovitz has
written:
The present legal structure thus falls short of its goals because its image of the
low-income consumer is not correct. As a result, it unwittingly favors the interest
of the merchant over those of the consumer by permitting deviant practices which
take advantage of the consumer's ignorance....
It is instructive to contrast the legal machinery dealing with the consumer de-
fendant with that dealing with the juvenile defendant. Enlightened public opinion
has led to the emergence of legal arrangements for juvenile offenders which, if biased
percentage of credit sales to total sales in states with garnishment is the same as in states
without garnishment.
160. This was the essence of the testimony of Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz before
the House Committee on Consumer Affairs. Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
734 (1967). Secretary Wirtz estimated that between 100,000 and 300,000 workers lose their
jobs every year by reason of wage garnishment. For a well documented study of garnishment
in Wisconsin, see Note, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 759,
766 (41% of garnished employees were warned that dismissal will follow second garnish-
ment). See also Note, Garnishment in Kentucky-Some Defects, 45 Ky. L.J. 322, 330
(1956); Wall St. J., March 15, 1966, at 1, col. 1. See Report of the National Advisory Com-
mission on Civil Disorders at 274-77 (1968).
161. "While consumer credit has enjoyed phenomenal growth over the past 20 years, so
have personal bankruptcies. Title II ...will relieve many consumers from the greatest
single pressure, forcing wage earners into bankruptcies." 2 US. Code Cong. & Admin. News
1963 (1968). See also Countryman, The Bankruptcy Boom, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1452 (1964).
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at all, favor the defendant rather than the plaintiff. The juvenile defendant is re-
garded as not fully responsible for his actions. The environmental pressures which
shape his behavior are taken into account when his behavior is assessed. The emphasis
is upon rehabilitation rather than retribution; the first offender is frequently let off
with a warning, and the courts try to provide the defendant with professional services
to aid in his rehabilitation. The findings of this study suggest that some of the gen-
eral assumptions made about the juvenile defendant also apply to many low-income
consumers. They, too, are not fully responsible for their actions. Poorly educated,
intimidated by complex urban society, bombarded with "bait advertising," they are
no match for high-pressure salesmen urging heavy burdens of debt upon them. Per-
haps legal machinery can be instituted, which takes these facts about low-income con-
sumers into account.
162
Wage garnishment helps to perpetuate the social evils that are destroy-
ing America. It is the responsibility of the bar to discover and eliminate
the vestiges of white power in social legislation, and wage garnishment
should therefore be a principle target. Social legislation to reconstruct the
life of the urban poor in the wealthiest society in the world must remove
the worker from welfare rolls, guarantee honest and productive employ-
ment and bring within the law's protection those who are now outside it.
162. D. Caplovitz, The Poor Pay More 189-91 (1967).
